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Summary
This report critically examines the nature of the distinction between 
traditional inter-state diplomacy and sustainable development 
diplomacy. It then sets out the institutional changes which are necessary 
for the achievement of sustainable development diplomacy. Multi-
stakeholder partnerships have been identified as a key means of 
implementation for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
Given the increasing centrality of the United States (US)–China 
relationship in global development cooperation, understanding the 
modalities of their engagement may provide useful insights into how 
partnerships may be cultivated and deepened to realise the SDGs. 
The Covid-19 pandemic and climate change have demonstrated 
the interconnection of the world, as well as the interconnection of 
challenges of the world. Sustainable development diplomacy is 
needed now more than ever to prioritise development strategies of 
different states and work on common shared challenges. Sustainable 
development diplomacy can only work when different actors recognise 
the value of the common goals and are willing to make an effort 
to accomplish them. Global sustainable development diplomacy 
requires a stronger policy agenda and greater cohesion. 
This report explores the idea of sustainable development diplomacy 
and, through two sectoral case studies, explores the nature, function, 
and rationale for interactive engagement. The form and structure of 
multi-actor relationships are a response to complex, trans-border 
political, social, economic, and environmental challenges which 
require a more nuanced and varied management approach than 
narrowly defined state-led development. However, the power 
dynamics, the modalities, and experiences of engagement that 
underpin these dynamic relationships, remain understudied, especially 
with regard to their impact on sustainable development.
Keywords
sustainable development diplomacy; climate change; global health 
governance; Covid-19 diplomacy; United States; China; pandemic; 
global development.
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Executive summary
To understand the problems of managing climate change, global 
Covid-19 strategies and forms of economic development, one has to 
realise the necessity for new forms of international diplomacy. These 
are not issues that can be resolved through inter-state diplomacy but 
require methods for defining issues and ranges of participants which 
necessitate revolutionary changes in the style of global governance. 
What is needed is sustainable development diplomacy.
What is the difference between traditional diplomacy and sustainable 
development diplomacy? The former is confined to inter-state interests, 
the primary one being national security, with a tendency to zero-sum 
alternatives. These are customarily dealt with at the inter-state level 
and by senior state officials. In contrast, sustainable development 
diplomacy – which could cover the fields of climate change and the 
Covid-19 pandemic, as well as the SDGs – is usually interconnected 
in innumerable ways and concerns more fundamentally the welfare of 
peoples across boundaries, that is, ‘the common welfare of mankind’. 
In sustainable development diplomacy, everyone together are the 
winners, or together they become the losers. Inevitably, stakeholders 
must be identified much more broadly than simply states, and 
the question then arises of whether these stakeholders have any 
prospect of effective participation in decision-making.
Yet immediately one has no choice but to recognise a fundamental 
difficulty in establishing a system of sustainable development diplomacy. 
The US and China have to find effective ways to establish common 
interests and thereby resolve the issues, above all, of climate change, 
but also large-scale development projects and a multilateral pandemic 
response in the development context. To the extent that geopolitical 
rivalry overtakes commitment to the ‘common welfare of mankind’ the 
world community is caught in a variant of the so-called ‘Thucydides 
trap’. That is to say that all sustainable development issues will be 
overshadowed by the fearful tensions between the two superpowers.
It is difficult to see how a new style of sustainable development diplomacy 
can emerge. The task of scholarly reflection is to provide significant 
indications of the direction which needs to be taken. For instance, there 
has to be a change in the intellectual tools and methods of diplomacy. 
Sustainable development issues have a very large amount of scientific and 
professional content, which is provided by specialised agencies, above all, 
leading United Nations (UN) bodies and non-governmental organisations.
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In the present practice of inter-state diplomacy, these bodies 
which are crucial to generating expertise are not directly able to 
participate in executive-style decision-making at the international 
governance level. Factual, scientific studies point directly to what 
must be done. Yet a crucial conceptual issue has to be confronted for 
a new sustainable development diplomacy to flourish. Is it possible 
to continue with the idea that scientific advice is one matter and 
policy decisions with respect to the scientific advice are another? 
How can scholarly reflection advance on this issue of the distinction 
between scientific advice and supposedly democratic policymaking? 
For instance, specialist UN bodies have a key role in elaborating 
sustainable development, and it is accepted that the UN lead defines 
the issues rather than the states. But for an issue to become political 
policy it usually has to be weighed against other issues. Yet, the issues 
under discussion – especially climate change and Covid-19 diplomacy 
– are absolute priorities and therefore sustainable development 
diplomacy would require a more categorical insistence that once 
scientific conclusions are reached, they have to be implemented.
The whole of international institutional decision-making has to change 
for sustainable development diplomacy to work. To achieve this, all 
the significant actors or players in climate change, Covid-19 and 
sustainable development must be identified – such as the business 
sector, medical professions, economists, banks, specialist UN and 
regional intergovernmental organisations. These are at present usually 
advisory bodies. In addition, as well as individual states having a 
role, all the pressure groups operating within states, that is, below 
the national level, also need to be involved internationally – this 
would be a revolution in the nature of international diplomacy. 
Of course, these recommendations are affected by the issue of US and 
Chinese geopolitical rivalry, which could overturn any real prospect 
of progress. The fundamental challenge is that the UN is the only 
forum where agreement can be brokered among 190+ countries.
So, in the final analysis, scholarly reflection has to keep constantly focused 
on the challenges posed by the US and China. However, there are in fact 
issues where the solutions could be favourable for both the US and China, 
which could encourage movement in a positive direction. For instance, the 
US president, Joe Biden, recognises that the US has to concentrate more 
on its own internal economic and social problems and he said in his UN 
speech that he does not want a cold war. Also, President Xi Jinping has 
spoken about a common shared future for mankind and this is a humanist 
concern with the whole of humanity, not with increasing the power of China. 
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Both the US and China have domestic and international goals, as outlined 
above, which could favour a new diplomacy, a sustainable development 
diplomacy. At the same time, scholarly reflection has to keep very 
firmly in view obstacles which are probably not going to go away. It is 
believed that if the two superpowers could bury their geopolitical rivalry 
to make way for a common future of mankind, all else would probably 
fall into place to ground a new sustainable development diplomacy.
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1. Introduction
Global development is at a turning point. We need to recognise there 
are differences and competition while still promoting development 
cooperation. Global challenges require global responses and local 
solutions. There is a pressing need for people to build up the capacity 
to better understand and better participate in global and national 
development. How to build an essential foundation and rules-based 
international order to share responsibilities and build mutual trust and 
understanding will be the critical challenge in the pandemic era. As United 
Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres addressed the General 
Assembly at the start of the General Debate on 21 September 2021:
We are on the edge of an abyss – and moving in the wrong direction. Our 
world has never been more threatened. Or more divided... The Covid-19 
pandemic has supersized glaring inequalities. The climate crisis is 
pummeling the planet… A surge of mistrust and misinformation is polarizing 
people and paralyzing societies. Human rights are under fire... Solidarity is 
missing in action… We must act fast.  
(Guterres 2021)
The speech points out severe challenges facing humankind: the Covid-19 
pandemic, climate change, rising inequalities, technological threats, 
and geopolitical tensions. In addition, remarks by US President Biden 
at the United Nations General Assembly also illustrate the necessity 
of tackling the Covid-19 pandemic, climate change, technological 
threats and exploitation, and terrorist threats, and the need for 
solidarity to cope with these shared challenges through sustainable 
diplomacy and political negotiations, with no intention to seek a new 
cold war, despite differing values and political divergence (Biden 2021). 
President Biden emphasises the fact that the security, prosperity, 
and freedom of each country are very interconnected, and therefore 
different countries must work together towards a shared agenda. 
These statements demonstrate the bottom line of diplomacy entering 
a new era: working together to address the most defining issues of our 
time is a priority and fits the best interests of all nations. Borderless global 
challenges require collective cooperation and response as well as a new 
form of diplomacy: sustainable development diplomacy (SDD). Traditionally, 
‘diplomacy is the institutionalized communication among internationally 
recognized representatives of internationally recognized entities through 
which these representatives produce, manage and distribute public 
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goods’ (Bjola and Kornprobst 2018: 6). SDD underscores the propriety 
of promoting the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) within the 
context of the still-raging coronavirus pandemic, the climate crisis and 
geopolitical divisions. It builds on and advances traditional diplomacy by 
taking the global context into consideration and conducting evidence-
based decision-making. More importantly, the essence of SDD is to seek 
mutual gains, as it results from meeting all parties’ needs to seek possible 
solutions (Moomaw et al. 2016). Consequently, SDD enables states to work 
together on common interests and prioritise their development strategies. 
The Covid-19 pandemic and climate change have demonstrated the 
interconnectedness of the world, as well as the interconnection between 
world challenges. The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2021, 
published by the UN, illustrated that the Covid-19 pandemic has had 
a negative impact on every SDG (UN 2021a). In other words, a health 
crisis has not only affected society in health sectors, but has also taken 
a toll on socioeconomic development. The United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) (2020) stated that ‘global human development – a 
combination of education, health, and living standards – could fall this 
year for the first time since 1990, when measurements began’. In addition, 
the Covid-19 pandemic has the potential to drive more than 1 billion 
people into extreme poverty by 2030, with 25 million people already 
living in extreme poverty due to the pandemic (ibid.). The Covid-19 
pandemic is still spreading, and the global economy is in recession. As 
a consequence, the 2030 SDGs are delayed and difficult to progress.
Meanwhile, climate change also poses a threat to social development 
and the economy, as well as bringing about political hardship, and it 
inevitably thwarts the SDGs. Extreme weather that results from climate 
change and global warming is damaging the planet and bringing 
devastating economic and social consequences (WMO 2021). Strong 
evidence has shown that economic crisis driven by climate change can 
give rise to conflict in certain countries and contexts (Koubi 2019). However, 
climate action is currently insufficient, and greenhouse gas emissions are 
off-schedule and nowhere close to meeting reduction goals (WMO 2021). 
These facts indicate the failure of global governance and the missing 
effective global leadership. The complexity of challenges facing global 
leaders requires sophisticated solutions to dismantle the built-in complexity, 
the ability to link issues together and understand their interconnections, 
and effective leadership that is cooperative and open-minded to tackle 
shared crises (Najam, Christopoulou and Moomaw 2004). Broader 
engagement between different actors and stakeholders is indispensable 
in addressing global challenges due to the scale of challenges and 
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intricacy of problems (Moomaw et al. 2016). The health crisis and climate 
crisis around the globe partially result from a lack of SDD that links different 
issues together and promotes more effective cross-border cooperation. 
The US–China relationship is the defining geopolitical contest of the 
twenty-first century. As two great powers of the world, the US and 
China are obliged to lead the international community (Allison 2017). 
Whether or not the US and China can cooperate with each other is a 
pivotal factor for tackling shared crises. Given the inherent complexity 
of and connections between the issues involved, SDD is needed to link 
multiple issues together in order to address any of them. In addition, 
effective leadership is critical to successful diplomacy, and a global and 
inclusive mindset is required to change traditional diplomacy to a more 
flexible approach that can respond to rapidly changing conditions, while 
meeting internationally agreed goals. This report will first examine the 
current crisis and the urgent need for SDD, analysing two of the most 
urgent challenges of the time through case studies, and then attempt 
to establish the US–China approach to SDD. The report will argue that, 
with shared crises and common interests, geopolitical contests between 
states should be oriented by common goals and mutual benefits, and 
limited to healthy competition and stable tension. It further discusses the 
missing pieces of SDD in the global governance crisis in the context of the 
Covid-19 pandemic and the essential elements for building back better.
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2. Strengthening multilateral 
diplomacy and the SDGs
In this report, we discuss SDD by shedding light on the Covid-19 health crisis 
and climate change. The conceptual framework presented in this research 
report draws on research undertaken by Najam et al. (2004) and Gu et al. 
(2016) to support sustainable development governance and new diplomacy. 
The SDGs were adopted by the UN in 2015 as a roadmap to improve 
and build a better world (UN 2021a). With 17 goals and 169 targets, 
they offer a shared vision of peace and prosperity for human 
beings and the planet by 2030. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development has been the most comprehensive agenda ever 
negotiated by UN member states (Kamau, Chasek and O’Connor 
2018). However, the several crises facing humankind have driven the 
SDGs in the wrong direction, nowhere near the expected targets. 
The Secretary-General of the United Nations, António Guterres, has 
described the Covid-19 pandemic as the greatest test since the 
establishment of the UN, indicating that it is not only a health emergency 
around the globe, but also a systemic crisis that takes its toll on economies 
and societies in many dimensions (UN 2021b). In addition, the consequences 
of climate change and global warming are disrupting societies all over the 
world: this year alone, harsh heatwaves have killed hundreds of people 
in the US and Canada, floods have brought devastating disasters to 
Germany and China, and wildfires have spiralled out of control in Siberia, 
Turkey, and Greece (Plumer and Fountain 2021). Strong evidence has 
shown the link between global warming and extreme weather disasters. 
The higher that global temperatures get, the more unpredictable and 
serious hazards there will be, and the greater the risk to humankind 
(IPCC 2021, forthcoming). These elements are all interconnected. 
The Covid-19 pandemic and climate change have indicated the 
interconnection of the world, as well as the interconnection of challenges 
within the world. We are reminded by the Covid-19 pandemic and climate 
change that some of our greatest challenges are not limited within 
borders, and immediate actions must be taken by nations. These great 
borderless global challenges of our time demonstrate the bottom line of 
nations and the need for a new type of diplomacy: working together to 
address the most defining issues of our time is in the best interests of all 
nations, and it requires collective cooperation and response via SDD. 
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Traditional diplomacy refers to ‘the peaceful conduct of relations amongst 
political entities, their principals and accredited agents’ (Hamilton and 
Langhorne 2011: 1). In other words, ‘Diplomacy is concerned with the 
management of relations between states and between states and 
other actors’ (Barston 2014: 1). Traditional diplomacy aims to protect 
sovereignty, economic interests, and territoriality, making it defensive 
in nature (Moomaw et al. 2016). By definition it seems that diplomacy is 
quite far away from development in the past. In 1973, Manuel Collantes 
mentioned development diplomacy the first time, saying that: 
all foreign affairs operations of the State are heavily directed towards the 
goal of national development… foreign policy is nothing but an extension 
of domestic policies projected towards the external and so it cannot 
drastically depart from the objective situation in the domestic sphere… 
(Collantes 1989: 55, cited in Barston 2014)
In addition, in order to elaborate on the role of diplomacy in development, 
Collantes further stated that: 
Diplomacy is heavily oriented towards economic ends such as maximizing 
trade, through negotiations, aid through cooperation and investments 
through incentives… diplomacy for development should be understood 
as a general guideline which seeks to the maximum terms realizable, 
the economic and social development needs of the country. This policy 
guideline now permeates the whole structure and scope of our foreign 
policy implementation programme. 
(ibid.)
Collantes pointed out the essence of traditional diplomacy in the above 
speech: it is about the national interests of a state. It further indicates that 
the external relations and diplomacy of a state highly relies on economic 
interests and development needs. 
According to Najam et al., new diplomacy:
talks in the language of rights; it also shifts the emphasis from states and 
sovereignty to human condition, from hierarchical to networked systems, 
from privileges to obligations, and from a discourse focused on the 
management of inter-state conflicts to a dialogue about cooperation. 
(Najam et al. 2004: 33)
By contrast, SDD goes beyond these narrow concepts and evolves 
consistently over the process of inter-state interactions and the 
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development of national and international priorities, building on 
traditional diplomacy and new diplomacy. It is not just for the national 
interests of one single state, but rather the best interest of all nations 
for a shared future. It is not an actor-oriented approach, but is a goal-
oriented diplomacy, and it builds on and advances beyond traditional 
diplomacy by taking the global context into consideration and conducting 
evidence-based decision-making. In other words, SDD results from the 
current complex global situation and is the solution to global problems. 
The SDGs enable member states to fight for a shared future with 
common goals. As a consequence, adapting SDD to cope with global 
challenges is the best way to proceed for the international community. 
SDD underscores the priority of promoting the 17 SDGs within the context 
of the still-raging Covid-19 pandemic, the climate crisis, and geopolitical 
divisions. Against this backdrop, SDD is diplomacy for the SDGs. The 
complexity of challenges facing global leaders requires sophisticated 
solutions to dismantle the built-in complexity, the ability to link issues 
together and understand their interconnections, and effective leadership 
that is cooperative and open-minded to tackle shared crises (Najam et al. 
2004). In other words, given the inherent complexity and interconnections 
of the issues involved, SDD is needed to link multiple issues together in 
order to address any of them. In addition, effective leadership is critical 
for successful diplomacy, and it requires a global and inclusive mindset 
to change traditional diplomacy to a more flexible approach that can 
respond to rapidly changing conditions, while meeting internationally 
agreed goals (Li et al. 2018). The health crisis and climate crisis around 
the globe partially result from a lack of SDD that links different issues 
together and promotes more effective cross-border cooperation. 
President Biden’s speech at the General Debate of the UN General 
Assembly on 21 September 2021 pointed out five challenges of our time: 
the Covid-19 pandemic, climate change, autocracy, technological threats 
and exploitation, and inequality (Biden 2021). He called for the solidarity 
to cope with these shared challenges through sustainable diplomacy and 
political negotiations, with no intention to seek a new cold war, despite 
different values and political divergence. Although President Biden did not 
mention China explicitly, there is no doubt that China is one of the challenges 
facing the US (Yan 2021). In addition, it seems that at least two out of the 
five challenges are associated with China. The speech is also reminiscent 
of the speech delivered by former Vice President Mike Pence in 2018:
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… many of Beijing’s policies most harmful to America’s interests and values, 
from China’s debt diplomacy and military expansionism; its repression 
of people of faith; construction of a surveillance state; and, of course, to 
China’s arsenal of policies inconsistent with free and fair trade, including 
tariffs, quotas, currency manipulation, forced technology transfer, and 
industrial subsidies.  
(Pence 2018)
The speech provides a good insight into so-called ‘technological threats’ 
and global power dynamics. It is apparent that the relationship between 
China and the US has not been ideal in recent years, and has featured 
various negative events: a new cold war, intellectual property theft, the 
Huawei ban, the trade war, the South China sea, cybersecurity attacks, 
Xinjiang issues, Taiwan issues, Covid-19 virus conspiracy theories, and so 
on. These partly result in the US placing China as a strategic competitor 
and considering China the biggest threat. According to the US Threat 
Assessment Report (ODNI 2021), China has been at the top of the threat list, 
and it is considered a rising challenge to the national security of the US. 
The US–China relationship seems to be one of the best interpretations 
of Thucydides’ trap, which refers to the inevitable disorder that follows 
from a growing power threatening to uproot a ruling power (Allison 2017). 
Roger Cohen shared his thoughts about China in the New York Times: 
‘keeping a low profile was yesterday’s story… the United States is now in 
a direct ideological war with China over the shape of the world in the 
twenty-first century’, as he believes that the message from the Chinese 
government is clear: ‘we’ll… one day run the world’ (Cohen 2019).
By contrast, Mahbubani believes that Chinese leaders:
have no missionary impulse to take over the world… China’s role and 
influence in the world will certainly grow along with the size of its economy. 
Yet, it will not use its influence to change the ideologies or political 
practices of other societies.  
(Mahbubani 2020: 254)
In addition, the Dean of the Institute of International Relations at 
Tsinghua University, Yan (2021) observes that China has no means to 
confront the US fully; instead, China is trying to narrow the competition 
to a few areas such as Covid-19 control, poverty reduction, trade, 
international development, 5G technologies, and digital payment 
systems. Unfortunately, such statements cannot change the majority 
perception of the China threat theory, resulting in an inevitable 
geopolitical contest between the two countries (Mahbubani 2020). 
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The most urgent and important question here is: who can benefit from the 
US–China clash? And what does that mean for the SDGs and significant 
global challenges such as the Covid-19 pandemic and climate change? 
Both China and the US face the looming threats of climate change and 
dealing with the Covid-19 health crisis, and in order to address the most 
significant challenges to humankind, they must work together. The inherent 
complexity and interconnections of global challenges means that cut-
throat competition would have unpredictable effects globally and thwart 
internationally agreed goals. To work together, both sides must make an 
effort to create a cooperative environment by respecting each other’s 
bottom lines. It is indispensable to know that US–China cooperation for 
SDD fits the best interests of all nations and it is the only way out. China and 
the US are the two biggest greenhouse gas emitters in the world (Plumer 
and Fountain 2021), and their participation and cooperation hold the key 
to success of solutions to global challenges. SDD demands sustainable 
development governance. Good governance is supposed to be based on 
the values of economic development, social justice, and ecological health 
(Najam et al. 2004). A new cold war or hostile attitudes towards each other 
is nowhere close to sustainable development. More importantly, it would 
further damage the SDG agenda and bring turbulence to the world. 
The following two case studies examine different actors and their 
significant roles in climate change and SDD, and global health governance, 
with a specific focus on China. The first case study will explore climate 
change as a form of SDD, the challenges to climate diplomacy, and 
the pathways that it may take going forward. It addresses the impacts 
of climate change and SDD between countries across the West, and 
those outside the West (most notably, China). The second case study 
will explore China’s position in terms of global health governance by 
shedding light on its strategies, policies, interactions, and implementations 
on global health issues within the international community.
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3. Climate change and sustainable 
development diplomacy 
Climate change is arguably the most serious challenge that the world 
will face this century, resulting in myriad impacts across the globe. It is a 
problem which defies boundaries because the actions of one country can 
impact upon many others. Therefore, it is important for countries to work 
together to mitigate climate change, both for their own self-interest and to 
protect others. In 2015, the world came together through the UN to create 
the historic Paris Agreement at the Conference of the Parties (COP) 21, with 
each signatory country promising to play its part in tackling the global crisis. 
However, it is no mean feat for nearly 200 nations to work in tandem to deliver 
on the promises they have made, where there are often conflicts of interest 
on an economic or political level. Effective and efficient climate diplomacy is 
therefore essential and needs to take place before the challenge spirals out 
of control and results in irreversible and highly damaging effects. COP 26, held 
in Glasgow in November 2021, is the next major opportunity to achieve this. 
This case study of climate change as a form of SDD serves as a literature 
review of climate diplomacy and policy across the world as it currently 
stands, in addition to an analytical report of the challenges to climate 
diplomacy and the pathways that it may take going forward. It begins 
by laying out the impacts of climate change on a physical and societal 
level, before considering what can be done to mitigate climate change 
and analysing why it is so difficult to meet the Paris Agreement targets.
Next, the case study explores climate and SDD between countries 
across the West, and those outside the West (most notably, China). 
Two mapping exercises are conducted. First, there is a map which 
explores the actors and organisations involved in this space, including 
prominent climate diplomats, government bodies focused on climate, 
and other organisations with an interest in or influence on policy. 
Second, there is a map of the structure of climate and SDD, including 
key frameworks, agreements, and targets set by countries.
Following this, the policy objectives and strategies of selected Western 
nations and of China are laid out, in addition to the climate policy 
dynamics between some of these countries. Then there is a discussion 
of the synergies and opportunities, as well as the complications 
and challenges, for global governance of climate change. Finally, 
there are sections which discuss the role of development diplomacy, 
particularly in the context of the post-Covid-19 world.
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3.1 Meeting targets on climate change mitigation
3.1.1 The impacts of climate change
The types of climate change can be categorised into a four-part structure, 
as follows (Cannon 2020):
1. Slow-onset changes, such as rising sea levels, melting glaciers, 
and changes to the patterns of El Niño/La Niña;
2. Stronger and more frequent natural hazards, such as floods 
and hurricanes;
3. Increased variability, such as seasons changing and weather patterns 
becoming less predictable;
4. Changing trends in rainfall and rising average temperatures. 
Vulnerability to climate change is a function of these physical elements, 
and social elements (Few 2007). The changing physical elements mean that 
social elements will also have to adapt in order to ensure that vulnerability 
does not increase to a dangerous level. Furthermore, each of the above 
climate changes has impacts on human systems, such as on agricultural 
resources, which are core to rural livelihoods (Cannon and Müller-Mahn 
2010), and on health-care systems as a result of increasing intensity, 
frequency, and duration of health problems (Frumkin and Haines 2019). 
Job losses are likely due to changes in industries resulting from climate 
change mitigation measures (ILO 2021). Climate change is therefore not 
a standalone issue, but one which will impact on every level of society. 
Given that climate change and its impacts will affect different regions 
and people to varying extents and in different ways, with poorer people 
and developing regions likely to suffer most,1 the question of ensuring 
a just transition is core to current debates on mitigating and adapting 
to climate change. This includes being sensitive to job losses in the 
context of reducing usage of fossil fuels (Evans and Phelan 2016), and 
other concepts such as a just transition as a framework for justice, or a 
governance strategy (Wang and Lo 2021). Furthermore, there is concern 
about ensuring equitable access to transport (Schwanen 2020), energy 
(Healy and Barry 2017) and sustainable products (Schröder 2020) 
throughout the transition to a green economy, for all members of society. 
1 For example, small island developing states, such as Tuvalu, are predicted to be among those 
nations most seriously impacted by climate change (IPCC 2018).
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3.1.2 What do we have to do to mitigate climate change?
In order to mitigate climate change, greenhouse gas emissions must 
be reduced. However, the exact method by which this is achieved is up 
for debate (UNEP 2017), and is at the core of the disagreements among 
diplomats regarding climate action. 
Increasing energy efficiency is one effective way to reduce emissions (IEA 
2019a). However, energy efficiency alone cannot eliminate emissions. 
Some argue that the priority is for the whole world to strive to use renewable 
energies rather than fossil fuels. For example, the International Renewable 
Energy Agency (IRENA) (2020a) proposes that up to 80 per cent of energy 
could be supplied through renewable sources by 2050. While renewables 
have a lot of potential, there are various challenges associated with using 
them. This includes the fact that wind and solar are variable energy sources 
which are only available when the conditions are conducive to energy 
production (IRENA 2020b), and the problem of the lack of battery storage 
options and infrastructure for feeding these energies into national energy 
grids (Regen Power 2021), which are not only inconvenient problems, but 
expensive to remedy. The challenges associated with renewables have 
led some to argue that fuels such as natural gas (IEA 2019b) and nuclear 
(Jawerth 2020) must play a role as transition fuels towards a green future. 
For the emissions that remain, carbon capture and sequestration/storage 
(CCS) technologies are frequently proposed as a way of preventing carbon 
dioxide from being emitted into the atmosphere during energy production 
or industrial processes (Gonzales, Krupnick and Dunlap 2020). Captured 
carbon dioxide is usually either stored long-term in geological formations, 
or repurposed in industry (e.g. for making fizzy drinks) (Osman et al. 2021). 
While progress is being made in the development of CCS technologies 
that can be applied at scale, there remain many elements which require 
further research and development before this can become a large-scale 
part of climate mitigation efforts (ibid.). Furthermore, concerns are often 
raised that CCS is floated as a justification for continuing to use polluting 
fuels rather than seeking to invest in cleaner energies (Budinis 2020). 
In order to achieve international emissions targets past 2050, the world will 
have to become carbon negative, removing more greenhouse gases from 
the atmosphere than are emitted into it (Budinis 2020). Given that Bhutan 
and Suriname are the only carbon-negative countries in the world at the 
time of writing (Wallach 2021), there is still a lot of progress to be made here. 
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3.1.3 What are the costs of mitigating climate change?
The Climate Policy Info Hub (2015) argues that, while there is huge variation 
in the estimates of how much it will cost to mitigate climate change, it 
is clear that delaying mitigation will result in greater costs overall. 
McKinsey & Company (2009) estimate that it will cost around €200–350bn 
per year by 2030 to pursue all the low-cost carbon abatement 
opportunities available, which Ritchie (2017) observes will be less than 
1 per cent of global gross domestic product (GDP). This cost estimate also 
puts into perspective the relatively small size of the US$100bn per year 
climate finance pledge made by developed countries through the Paris 
Agreement to help developing countries to pursue a green transition. 
The New Climate Economy (2014) estimates that the savings resulting 
from the co-benefits of climate mitigation often far outweigh 
the costs. These savings manifest in the form of lives saved due 
to reduced air pollution, less waste and higher energy efficiency, 
among other benefits (Grantham Research Institute 2018). When 
estimating the costs of climate mitigation, it is therefore crucial to also 
consider the savings resulting from the measures implemented. 
3.1.4 What are the difficulties in meeting the targets of the 
Paris Agreement?
Diplomacy is key to resolving the difficulties in meeting the targets of 
the Paris Agreement, many of which revolve around disagreements on 
the details of the methods that should be taken in order to achieve the 
targets. The Paris rulebook, which is designed to be a roadmap towards 
the goals that were agreed upon at COP 21 in Paris, was (mostly) accepted 
by signatories to the Agreement at COP 24 in Katowice (World Resources 
Institute 2019). The rulebook requires countries to periodically submit 
targets called Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), but leaves 
each country to determine what their NDCs will be and how they will 
achieve them. Agreeing on the details of the policies to implement, both 
within and between countries, is a sticking point for many nations. 
A contributing factor to this difficulty is clashes in national interests, which 
are discussed in further detail below. When what is most economically 
or politically beneficial for one nation puts another at a disadvantage, 
it is difficult to come to an agreement about what approach to take. 
This is prevalent in the climate space, where the impacts of climate 
change affect different countries to different extents and not all in the 
same way, and where the human and capital resources required to 
pursue climate solutions are not evenly distributed across the world. 
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Furthermore, climate change mitigation involves actions which flow 
against the current model of economic development. For example, 
reducing consumerism (Phillips 2015), and investing lots of money to replace 
energy systems which are still functioning (albeit being damaging to 
the climate), may not seem to make the most sense at first glance from 
a purely economic standpoint (although they do often have longer-
term economic benefits). In the absence of incentives to counteract 
this, it is self-undermining for actors to pursue such climate solutions. 
Regarding COP 26 as the next significant opportunity for climate 
diplomacy to make steps towards implementing the Paris Agreement, 
there are major concerns around the inequitable distribution of 
Covid-19 vaccines globally because of fears that delegates from 
many countries (particularly developing countries) will be unable to 
attend in person or will be putting their families at risk when they return 
home (Farand 2021). This is an indication of how major global crises, 
such as pandemics and climate change, are interlinked. Parallels can 
also be drawn between the Covid-19 and climate crises regarding 
how countries must put their own pure pursuit of self-interests aside 
sometimes and remember that no one is safe until everyone is.
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3.2 Mapping the actors and organisations in climate and sustainable 
development diplomacy
Figure 3.1 Map of the climate space
Source: Authors’ own
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3.2.1 Analysis of climate and sustainability map 
Figure 3.1 maps out the key actors and organisations involved in the climate 
space. Each of the sections of this map is explored in further detail below. 
Climate diplomats
Some countries have specific climate diplomats who represent their 
country in climate-related negotiations. Current key diplomats include 
John Kerry, the United States Special Envoy on Climate selected by 
Biden, Xie Zhenhua, China’s Special Envoy for Climate Change, and 
Alok Sharma, President of COP 26 (UK). These individuals are significant 
because they have a high level of authority on climate-related policy in 
their respective contexts. The relationships between them can have an 
important impact on the progress that is made in climate diplomacy. 
In some other countries, other government officials are in charge of 
determining climate policy and diplomatic endeavours. For example, Shih 
(2021) explains that, in South Korea, it is the presidents who have played 
the most significant role in climate negotiations and treaties such as the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Kyoto 
Protocol and Paris Agreement. 
It is important to pay attention to the announcements made by key climate 
diplomats, which may be reflective of the deeper policy position of the 
country or body that they represent. 
National climate change bodies
In certain cases, it is generic/broad branches of governments which 
are tasked with taking care of climate diplomacy, such as the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in China. Some countries have 
specific bodies or government branches focused specifically on climate, such 
as the UK Committee on Climate Change, the New Zealand Climate Change 
Commission, and the Australian Climate Change Authority. Since the climate 
field is still relatively new, it is significant to analyse the relationship between 
these bodies, as some appear to be modelled on or inspired by others. 
In the US, there is currently no federal agency whose job is to develop a 
systemic understanding of climate change impacts on society (Carr 2020); 
several government branches and initiatives are involved in climate policy, 
including the Environmental Protection Agency and the US Global Change 
Research Programme.
Banks and financial sector initiatives with a strong interest in climate change
Most major banks and financial actors publish regular climate reports. 
For example, Goldman Sachs has produced reports on risks and 
opportunities related to climate change in terms of harnessing the 
innovative capital market (2019), and on how their approach to climate 
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rests on the pillars of climate transition and inclusive growth (2020). Morgan 
Stanley has reported on their commitment to transitioning to a low-
carbon economy, assessing climate risks, achieving operational resilience, 
and being transparent (Morgan Stanley 2020). The involvement of the 
financial sector in climate action and sustainability offers substantial 
opportunities for governments to collaborate on leveraging capital 
for a climate transition. This is also relevant to the domain of public–
private partnerships, which are often discussed as a way to encourage 
private investment incentivised by government regulations or offers. 
Organisations involved in finance and development also often display 
an interest in climate policy and action. For example, Hawkins (2020) 
observes that the International Monetary Fund has proposed a package 
of policies related to climate action. These include the following:
– An 80 per cent subsidy rate for the production of renewable energy;
– A ten-year programme for investment in renewable energy, low-carbon 
transport, and energy-efficient buildings;
– Carbon pricing adjusted to aim for an 80 per cent reduction in emissions 
by 2050;
– Compensation for poor households when carbon price affects their 
purchasing power. 
The World Bank has advocated for nature-smart policies (Johnson et al. 
2021) and has collaborated with the International Bank of Reconstruction 
and Development on the Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report (2021). 
As demonstrated by this work, which combines climate policy with the SDGs, 
global financial institutions are in a position to tackle multiple elements of 
sustainable development simultaneously, using the SDGs as a framework. 
Global bodies with a strong interest in climate change
The UN is the root of several climate change bodies and initiatives. 
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO) together established the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), whose job is to 
thoroughly review the science behind climate change. UNEP has also 
established the Intergovernmental Panel on Ecosystems and Biodiversity, 
which recently collaborated with the IPCC on a workshop relating 
to biodiversity and climate change (Pörtner et al. 2021). Furthermore, 
the UN is the source of the SDGs, including SDG 13 on climate action. 
Global multilateral bodies such as these are uniquely able to craft 
frameworks and policies which can influence a vast array of countries 
around the world, which can incentivise collaboration (and, where 
appropriate, competition) to achieve climate action globally. 
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Companies/initiatives with a strong interest in/influence on climate policy
There are a number of initiatives designed to influence the way that 
private sector actors behave in the face of climate change. These include 
Business for Social Responsibility Corporation 2020, the World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development and the Alliance of CEO Climate 
Leaders. These are important because they can establish incentives 
and provide frameworks and learning for private sector companies to 
pursue environmental, social and governance factors, which include 
a climatic component. It will become increasingly important for this to 
involve the establishment of standards, so as to avoid greenwashing. 
Also notable are the Chinese national oil companies, which are state-owned 
but believed to have a significant influence on climate policy in China 
(Aidoo et al. 2017). These are the China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC), China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), and China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). It is a challenge when there 
are actors influencing policy for whom climate action is not in their best 
interests in the short term, because it flies in the face of reason for them 
to restrict their own growth by advocating for emissions reductions. 
A note on local diplomacy
Figure 3.1 focuses on international and national-level climate diplomacy. 
However, action on all levels will be necessary when it comes to climate 
action, including on the regional and local levels. The South African 
Cities Network (Pillay and Potgieter 2021) notes that city diplomacy 
networks are relevant to this discussion. Some of the mechanisms that 
city diplomacy networks may use include sharing best practice, public–
private partnerships and building of regional and local networks to 
enable climate action. Local diplomacy is arguably one of the most 
important levels of diplomacy with regards to climate action because 
the need for swift action and changes to lifestyles will require significant 
positive buy-in locally in order to build trust and avoid protests against 
the policies necessary to protect the environment and societies. 
A note on non-state actors involved in climate diplomacy
Climate diplomacy involves a range of actors from within and outside of 
the government. Hoogeveen and Verkooijen (2010) observe that there 
are three categories of actors in forest diplomacy: state actors, market 
actors and civil society actors. The same can be observed for climate 
diplomacy more generally. There are a lot of different actors involved in 
oil diplomacy in China alone, for example, at all levels of governance. 
This includes local people and organisations, international institutions, 
multinational corporations and state-run corporations (Aidoo et al. 2017). 
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Moomaw et al. (2016) and Sénit (2020) argue that state and non-state 
actors should be involved in SDD. Barritt (2018) explains that it is important 
for new diplomatic actors such as non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and civil society organisations to have a right to participate 
and influence climate change negotiations because they represent the 
interests of those who cannot themselves be present (e.g. animals, the 
environment). Since climate change has surfaced as a result of neglecting 
the ‘interests’ of the environment, it is important to change systems so 
that avoiding damaging externalities is built into the approach.
However, while non-state actors such as NGOs do get involved in 
climate policy, framework, and target discussions, such as at the 
COPs to the UNFCCC, they often have no formalised role in deciding 
which policies will be selected. Sénit (2020) explains that civil society 
actors usually have no formal voting rights in these instances, meaning 
that their influence is limited to persuasion of those who can vote, or 
participation in informal spaces with no direct influence on policy. It 
may be necessary to consider the mechanisms through which non-
state actors are able to influence climate policy in order to ensure true 
participation and representation of the interests of the environment.
30Research Report Volume 2021 Number 86 
Building Back Better: Sustainable Development Diplomacy in the Pandemic Era
ids.ac.uk
3.3 Mapping the structure of climate and sustainable development diplomacy
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3.3.1 High-level description of frameworks, agreements, and targets
Influence of the UNFCCC and IPCC over global climate policy
The UNFCCC is significant in that it has near-universal membership 
(197 parties) and is the parent treaty of other influential agreements, 
namely the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement (UNFCCC 2021). Country 
commitments to the Paris Agreement are often tracked by climate 
accountability structures (see below). This is therefore the defining 
framework that underpins all other action on climate around the world.
The IPCC is a very well-known UN body whose task is to review the 
science behind climate change. Its work is invaluable for ensuring that 
all members have access to accurate scientific assessments of the 
causes and probable impacts of climate change. However, it does not 
itself create climate policies because its focus is on science rather than 
diplomacy. Kouw and Petersen (2018) note that science cannot resolve 
conflicts because it is not in itself a referee. It can only provide information 
which can be used by diplomats to make decisions. The most recent IPCC 
report describes human influence on global warming as ‘unequivocal’ 
(2021: 6). This strong and certain language, despite being descriptive 
rather than prescriptive, backs up the necessity for policymakers to act in 
the best interests of the environment and societies threatened by climate 
change, motivated by a confident foundation in climate science. 
Climate targets and accountability structures 
Countries which are subscribed to the Paris Agreement agree to set 
climate targets for themselves, known as NDCs. One part of this is often 
to set a target year for achieving net zero emissions. For example, the 
European Union (EU), UK, US, Canada, and New Zealand have set a target 
of achieving net zero emissions by 2050; China has set its target as 2060, 
and Australia has not yet set any firm target. Countries may also set other 
targets under their NDCs or as part of their national climate policy; a 
selection of China’s targets are shown in Figure 3.2 for illustrative purposes. 
There are several independent bodies that monitor country climate 
action commitments and progress. These include the Climate Change 
Performance Index, Climate Action Tracker, and Climate Equity Reference 
Project. One challenge in terms of accountability is the fact that, for 
many countries, their climate targets are not legally binding. This means 
that there is ample room for avoiding or falling short of targets. 
Influential climate reports 
Various national and international bodies produce climate-related 
reports for a variety of purposes. For example, the IPCC produces 
Assessment Reports, which provide information on topics such 
as the physical science basis for climate change, in addition to 
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special reports such as the well-known report Global Warming 
of 1.5°C (2018), which are used to inform policy decisions. 
Some government bodies release their own documents, policies, and 
pledges. The UK Committee on Climate Change publishes a regular 
carbon budget (now in its sixth iteration), and a detailed report on how 
the UK will achieve net zero emissions. The US is in its fourth iteration of 
the National Climate Assessment. Canada has produced a net zero 
emissions document too, in addition to a climate plan for a healthy 
environment and economy. These documents can have an impact not 
only upon national policies, but also on the policies of other jurisdictions 
which observe their data and act upon their recommendations. 
3.4 The implications of national climate 
approaches for multipolar global governance
3.4.1 Policy objectives and strategies of Western nations, and of China
Western nations 
Western nations do not have a uniform approach regarding their climate 
strategies and policies. It is therefore necessary to observe each nation 
individually. 
However, Western democracies do face a shared set of challenges that 
are distinct from those of autocracies when it comes to the politics of 
addressing climate change. Barritt (2018) argues that democracies have to 
be sensitive to the range of values and interests that are involved when it 
comes to approaching environmental policy. For example, it is challenging to 
incorporate damage to the environment into democratic decision-making; 
is the solution to treat the environment like a democratic subject? Also, it is 
difficult for democracies to have to work towards predefined goals (namely, 
protecting the planet), because this flies in the face of what they usually do. 
United States
The climate policy of the US has undergone multiple transitions over 
the past three governments. President Obama instated a range of 
policies, which were repealed by the Trump administration, famously 
including the removal of the US from the Paris Agreement. This move 
correlated with a rise in US emissions (Gallagher and Zhang 2019).
Since President Biden has come to power, he has rejoined the Paris 
Agreement, hosted the Leaders Summit on Climate, and convened 
the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate Change, making 
it clear that climate change is to henceforth be a core pillar of US 
33Research Report Volume 2021 Number 86 
Building Back Better: Sustainable Development Diplomacy in the Pandemic Era
ids.ac.uk
foreign policy (Lewis and Edwards 2021). He has also pledged nearly 
US$2tn towards green energy and infrastructure, to be invested 
over the coming decade (Holden 2020; McDonald 2020).
Ritter Jr (2021) argues that there are several steps that President 
Biden will need to take regarding climate, aside from reinstating 
the policies that President Trump repealed. This includes:
– Putting pressure on other countries to commit to significant 
climate action (as John Kerry has already begun doing); 
– Transitioning towards clean energy in the power sector (this may be 
a challenge because decisions made in this domain at the federal 
level may be repealed at the state level, owing to the nature of states 
usually taking the lead in monitoring what occurs in the power sector);
– Transforming the transport industry, which is currently the single 
biggest carbon dioxide emitter of all sectors in the US; 
– Instating a climate bill which ensures that an incrementally 
increasing cap is placed on emissions over time. 
Lewis and Edwards (2021) propose that the main priorities of the US 
when it comes to climate policy and diplomacy are domestic economic 
recovery following the Covid-19 pandemic, and stimulating green growth. 
President Biden’s strategy to achieve these goals involves bringing the 
whole administration on board, so that climate is integrated into all 
aspects of policy (Ritter Jr 2021). Hilton et al. (2021) suggest that the US 
could lead in offering clean power and aid programmes to developing 
countries, in order to assist in climate action while gaining soft power. 
Canada
For Canada, transitioning to climate-friendly policies is a tall order 
because oil extraction makes up a significant proportion of economic 
activity. Canada produces 4.7 million barrels of oil per day, 80 per cent 
of which are from the province of Alberta, where low taxes have resulted 
in the Alberta Heritage Fund being limited in value (Campbell 2021). The 
Canadian government continues to subsidise the production of fossil 
fuels, having provided around US$14.6bn since early 2020 (which is roughly 
the same amount that was spent on green energies) (ibid.). Emissions in 
Canada increased by over 20 per cent between 1990 and 2019, mostly 
due to the development of the oil sands industry, and it is predicted that 
oil production will rise by 41 per cent between 2018 and 2040 (ibid.). 
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There are several additional challenges for Canada regarding climate policy, 
including the following:
– Environmental protection is not a constitutional right in Canada, 
and no comprehensive climate law exists (MacLean 2020); 
– The climate policy process is limited in inclusivity and equality. Trade 
unions and NGOs are not often consulted (Campbell 2021);
– Private petroleum corporations have the ability to influence climate 
policy, and are able to make all their own production and investment 
decisions. They are accountable to no-one but their shareholders (ibid.);
– The influence of the federal government on climate policy is weak (ibid.);
– Climate is a politically difficult issue. There are disagreements 
across parties, across different regions (which are all affected 
to different extents and in different ways), and certain provincial 
governments are against introducing a carbon tax (ibid.).
Harrison (2020) presents a pattern which seems to occur regularly when it 
comes to Canadian climate policy:
1. The government announces a bold emissions target, set in the 
distant future. 
2. Years later, the government releases a much less bold plan than that 
which they announced in (1).
3. The plan announced in (2) is not really followed through.
4. Certain subsidies are introduced, which are popular, but have 
limited impact.
5. Those policies which are likely to be genuinely effective are delayed 
repeatedly due to having to pass through several rounds of consultations, 
and then they are scrapped.
6. A new government takes over and shames the previous government 
for not having achieved any effective climate measures.
7. Return to step (1). 
Despite this pattern of unsuccessful policies, Harrison (2020) notes that the 
most recent plan could be different because this time regulation is a 
key feature. 
Some of the policies which Canada has introduced include creating a law 
for reducing emissions by over 30 per cent compared to 2005, banning 
Arctic offshore drilling for at least a limited time (Campbell 2021), and tripling 
the national carbon price between 2022 and 2030 (Harrison 2020). 
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United Kingdom
Hunt and Fitzgerald (2020) observe that UK climate plans tend to have 
two pillars:
1. Reducing emissions as fast as possible.
2. Removing greenhouse gases at the same rate as unavoidable emissions 
are being released. 
They argue that the UK ten-point plan for a green industrial revolution 
relies mostly on the first of these pillars, and that it is a very ambitious 
plan. However, there are concerns that, while the UK’s ten-point plan 
is indeed ambitious, it does not lay out in sufficient detail a roadmap 
for achieving its own targets. Without a set of practical policies to 
realise the ambitions, the plan will remain a plan, rather than reality. 
Europe
Muinzer (2019) outlines the EU Green Deal, which aims to ensure that 
the EU can reach net zero emissions by 2050. The strategy underlying 
this plan is a growth strategy, where climate is seen as an opportunity 
for economic growth and modernisation of the economy. In order to 
achieve this, an investment figure of €260bn per year is proposed. The 
EU’s recent Fit for 55 package outlines in detail the proposed methods 
by which this will be achieved, including the Emissions Trading Scheme 
and a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (Oroschakoff 2021) to 
protect the competitiveness of European products against imports 
from countries which have a lower price on carbon (Holden 2020).
Australia
Australia has been criticised for not reducing its emissions sufficiently quickly; 
Pacific leaders from neighbouring nations in particular have called for 
Australia to do more to tackle climate change (McDonald 2021). Previously, 
Australia’s Climate Change Authority had a highly influential role regarding 
Australia’s carbon budget and emissions targets, but this influence faded 
once the Clean Energy Act was repealed in 2014 (Stephens 2021). Stephens 
(2021) argues that, in order to be effective, Australia’s climate laws must be 
legally binding, and that voluntary recommendations will have no impact. 
The Australian prime minister has pledged AUS$539m towards clean 
hydrogen and carbon capture and storage development (McDonald 
2021). McDonald (2021) suggests that this investment in technology is Scott 
Morrison’s way of finding a compromise in the face of competing pressures. 
Quiggin (2020) reports that the Australian federal budget was split between 
non-renewable and renewable energy sources and initiatives. On the 
former side, the government pledged to upgrade a coal-fired power 
station in New South Wales, as well as allocating AUS$52.9m to the gas 
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industry. On the latter side, they gave AUS$5m towards the promotion of 
electric vehicles, and AUS$1.4bn for renewables over the following decade.  
New Zealand
Hall (2020) proposes that New Zealand is a fast follower, rather than 
a leader, on climate. In other words, they observe the commitments 
of other nations and then make their own policies and pledges 
such that they are in line with international ambitions. 
Some of New Zealand’s climate policies are as follows:
– Reduce emissions by 30 per cent compared to 2005 levels 
(although note that this figure is for net emissions rather than gross 
emissions, meaning that in practice, New Zealand could increase 
its emissions overall and still reach its target) (McLachlan 2020);
– The Zero Carbon Act, which enshrines in law the requirement for New 
Zealand to have net zero emissions by 2050 (Hall 2020; McLachlan 2020);
– An Emissions Trading Scheme (McLachlan 2020);
– A Green Investment Finance Fund, worth NZ$100m (Hall 2020);
– Establishment of a Task Force on Climate-related Financial 
Disclosure (ibid.).
China
China’s approach to climate policy and diplomacy is significant on the 
global stage, given that China releases 28 per cent of the world’s emissions 
(Tan et al. 2020). Wu (2018) argues that China’s climate and energy approach 
is characterised by three main factors. First, policies are tailored to ensure 
that China can sustain economic growth. Second, policies are impacted by 
interdependence with other countries and norms related to climate 
protection. Third, climate is not a policy priority for China compared to the 
goals of ensuring wealth for its citizens and enhancing its status as a 
global power. 
On the contrary, Kahn (2016) argues that climate policy is in fact highly 
relevant for China, due to factors such as reducing air pollution, winning 
green export opportunities, and increasing soft power internationally, 
while Brown (2021) notes China’s wish to decrease its dependence on other 
nations. Furthermore, Xie (2021) adds that protection of water resources, 
food security and regional security are all additional motivating factors 
for China to want to protect the environment. Maizland (2021) observes 
that there have been a rising number of protests within China resulting 
from a growing public awareness of climate change and environmental 
degradation, which may serve as an additional incentive for action.
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Other factors influencing China’s climate policy include the UNFCCC (Yu 
2008), the interests of the Chinese Communist Party (Moore 2011) and the 
desire to increase wealth and exploit economic opportunities (Wu 2016; 
Wintour 2021). 
China currently has a range of climate targets and pledges, including the 
recent goal of achieving net zero emissions by 2060, in addition to peaking 
carbon dioxide emissions before 2030 and creating 1.2 billion kilowatts-worth 
of solar and wind generators by 2030 (Maizland 2021). Gallagher and Zhang 
(2019) predict that China’s emissions will in fact peak in advance of the 
2030 target. 
There are over 100 policies in place to back up China’s climate targets 
(ibid.), including: energy efficiency standards for power plants, transport 
and buildings; a tariff policy for renewable energy generators, which offers a 
guaranteed price for the energy they produce; limits to coal consumption; 
and a national emissions trading scheme (ibid.). China also offers subsidies 
to people who purchase electric cars (Kahn 2016). Local provinces 
are allowed to pioneer small environmental projects without seeking 
permission from the central government first (Farhan 2017; Gu et al. 2018). 
However, Tan et al. (2020) observe that China has allowed some room 
for manoeuvre in many of its pledges and policies. For example, they 
‘aim to’ achieve net zero, they may make climate action conditional 
based on developed countries providing it with support (as stipulated 
in the Paris Agreement), and there appears to be some very selective 
calculation of emissions figures, which involves excluding exports (ibid.). 
Many of China’s climate-damaging policies involve its actions abroad, 
such as its heavy investment in overseas oil extraction amounting to 
946.4m barrels between the 1990s and 2013 (Aidoo et al. 2017) and 
having financed coal plants overseas through the Belt and Road 
Initiative (Gallagher and Zhang 2019).2 China is also currently building 
coal plants at 60 locations within China (Brown 2021), and while many 
of the most inefficient coal plants are being shut down, they are being 
left dormant and reopened to cover gaps in energy needs (Lewis and 
Edwards 2021). However, energy demand is set to decrease due to 
increased energy efficiency and the movement of the economy towards 
the service and digital technology industries (Tan et al. 2020).
2 China announced at the recent UN General Assembly that it would no longer finance coal plants 
abroad in an effort to reduce emissions (Sun 2021).
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3.4.2 Climate policy dynamics between countries 
Australia as unambitious compared to other Western nations
The international community has been critical of Australia, which is currently 
one of the only large, developed countries to not have set a big climate 
target (Grattan 2020). There are several factors which have put pressure on 
Australia to make a move in this space. The National Farmers’ Federation of 
Australia, which is usually a more conservative organisation, has called for 
climate action, as did the leaders present at the 2019 Pacifitc Islands Forum 
(McDonald 2020). Most recently, President Biden’s approach to climate, which 
has restored climate ambition for the US, has left Australia isolated among 
developed countries regarding its less ambitious stance on climate (ibid.). 
Zali Steggall, independent member of parliament for Warringah, has 
proposed a Climate Change Bill, modelled on the UK Climate Change Act 
(Stephens 2021). If this were to be passed, it would include a net zero by 2050 
target, the creation of an independent body to advise the government (like 
the UK Climate Change Committee), and the setting of carbon budgets 
every five years (ibid.). This would assist in increasing climate ambition 
in Australia. 
The US putting pressure on China
Hilton et al. (2021) have suggested that the US and China could pick 
up on the climate diplomacy template that Presidents Obama and 
Xi Jinping created, now that Biden is the president of the US.
The United States Special Presidential Envoy on Climate, John Kerry, 
has been putting pressure on China to make its climate targets and 
policies more ambitious since shortly after Biden assumed office. He has 
criticised China for giving itself a longer timeline than other countries 
to reach net zero emissions (Worland 2021), and has said that the US 
will monitor China’s climate progress using American satellites (Boyle 
2021). Questions have been raised on the legitimacy of the US criticising 
other nations when it has no set carbon price and has not had the most 
ambitious track record on climate policy over the preceding years. 
Nonetheless, Xi Jingping attended a climate conference hosted by the US in 
April 2021 (Maizland 2021). This suggests that, despite the tensions between 
these two countries, there is potential for them to cooperate in this area. 
China’s ambition puts pressure on the West
Despite the criticisms that have been made in the West towards China’s 
climate policy, Tan et al. (2020) argue that China’s push for climate 
puts pressure on the West – particularly Australia. This is because 
the policies which China is now implementing will potentially reduce 
imports from Australia, such as iron ore and coking coal (ibid.).
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Furthermore, Nair (2019) proposes that overconsumption patterns, as well 
as governance structures which do not permit sustained action in the 
economy against vested interests, make it difficult to advance climate 
change policies in the West. On the contrary, China’s political approach 
allows the state to intervene and steer the economy more easily (ibid.).
3.5 The role of development diplomacy 
in the context of the SDGs and global 
climate policy initiatives
Naupa (2017) argues that countries need to strive to create agreements 
around common goals, through bilateral, multilateral and multi-actor 
relations. Hoogeveen and Verkooijen (2010) propose that attempting to come 
to a unanimous agreement in SDD contexts can distract from other solutions 
– in other words, that it is important to not make best the enemy of the good.
In summary, the roles of SDD include:
– Finding mutual areas of benefit; 
– Holding each other accountable;
– Identifying and securing national security threats;
– Considering climate policies against other issues;
– Supporting other countries in sustainable development (e.g. through 
the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Build Back Better World (B3W)).
3.5.1 Synergies and opportunities 
Promoting healthy competition 
Hilton et al. (2021) suggest that constructive competition in clean energy may 
better suit the dynamic between the US and China than pure cooperation, 
and Maizland (2021) claims that the plan in the US is to expand green energy 
for this very reason. Wen (2021) and Hilton et al. (2021) note that competition 
does not have to be a negative thing, so long as the intended outcome 
is progress.
Promoting collaboration
Moomaw et al. (2016) observe that SDD attempts to identify mutual gains for 
those involved because, ultimately, a sustainable world is one from which 
everyone can benefit.
There are many examples of collaboration between countries with 
regards to sustainable development. Japan and Indonesia have worked 
together on the Joint Crediting Mechanism Initiative, resulting in clean 
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energy provision to buildings within Palembang, Indonesia (Robertua 
and Sihura 2020). The US and Japan work with countries in Southeast 
Asia on private investment projects to increase water security (Namba 
2019). Japan, South Korea and China have held meetings to discuss 
approaches to dealing with smog and acid rain (Maizland 2021), and 
the EU is helping China with its emissions trading scheme (ibid.).
Although competition is the target for many areas of the US–China 
sustainable development relationship, Lewis and Edwards (2021) 
propose that the US should work with China when it comes to 
increasing climate ambition and reaching net zero emissions. 
Promoting science diplomacy and collaboration 
Thompson (2018) argues that the global North and global South need 
to work together when it comes to science diplomacy for sustainable 
development, because science can build trust between countries and 
help overcome artificial boundaries of geography. According to Pisupati 
(2020), the Covid-19 pandemic has demonstrated the great extent to 
which countries of the world are interconnected through science, and that 
we therefore ought to emphasise science diplomacy going forward. 
Moomaw (2018) proposes that scientists and diplomats need to learn 
each other’s skills in order to collaborate effectively. Ruffini (2018) 
suggests that when diplomats do not understand the science of, for 
example, the IPCC reports, science diplomacy faces challenges. 
An existing example of science diplomacy for sustainable development 
is the cooperation that exists between the UK and Russia on research in 
the Arctic (Berkman et al. 2017; Gutenev 2020). This demonstrates how 
science diplomacy may be a way for countries to collaborate even when 
there are other issues that they disagree on (Berkman et al. 2017).
Kleinhaus et al. (2020) argue that one important case where science 
diplomacy for sustainable development is needed is between Egypt, 
Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia on the protection of the Red Sea Reef, 
which is threatened by the impending impacts of climate change.
3.5.2 Complications and challenges 
Which diplomatic levers should feature?
Hilton et al. (2021) propose that countries need to use diplomatic levers 
in order to further climate action. Having said this, Stashwick (2021) 
notes that it does not make sense for China, for example, to attempt to 
use climate policy as a bargaining chip against other issues it believes 
are important, because it needs climate change to be dealt with for 
its own sake. On this note, John Kerry has said that the US will not make 
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deals with China which promote ambitious climate policies at the cost 
of ignoring human rights concerns. While it is important to develop 
climate policy in tandem with policies on other issues, climate ambition 
should not be conditional upon compromises in other domains.
National security threats
One challenge for countries trying to implement more ambitious climate 
policies is to balance this with national security requirements. 
For example, for China, coal is a more secure energy source than (the 
cleaner) natural gas because there is much more of the former available 
within China (Kahn 2016). Premier Li Keqiang has pointed out that coal 
is a secure energy option for China, and the Chinese Communist Party 
has said that energy security is a priority (Lewis and Edwards 2021). This 
makes transitioning to cleaner fuel options at speed a challenge. 
Another example is how countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council have 
a tendency to avoid dependence on other countries by developing their 
own energy and sustainability policies (Al-Saidi, Zaidan and Hammad 
2019). It is important that no country must be forced to compromise 
its national security while transitioning to cleaner fuel sources. 
Lack of coordination 
The volume and range of actors within the sustainable development 
space can make diplomacy very complicated. Robertua and Sihura 
(2020) claim that the lack of coordination between the government, 
private sector and civil society is holding back countries such as Indonesia 
when it comes to climate policy. Establishing common frameworks 
which can be implemented at different levels is important for ensuring 
that action is coordinated and that climate action is inclusive. 
Conflicts of interest
Barritt (2018) notes that climate change pays no attention to borders, 
and that whatever decision one country makes will impact upon 
another. Furthermore, regarding climate change and sustainability, 
there are a great variety of interests involved that are not relevant 
to other forms of diplomacy, such as those of non-nationals, future 
generations, animals, plants and ecosystems (ibid.). It is difficult 
to create policies where all such interests are accounted for.
Ruffini (2018) observes that science diplomacy tends to suffer when there are 
mismatches between different countries’ interests. Countries must be willing 
to acknowledge these differing interests and prevent others from being put 
at a disadvantage in order to ensure that climate diplomacy progresses 
at the speed necessary to avoid further damage to the environment. 
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Historical injustices
Denton (2018) argues that historical contributions to climate change 
feature prominently when it comes to creating climate policies. They 
are often framed in a discourse and used to back up policy proposals 
(ibid.). Climate justice in relation to historical emissions is another factor 
to be taken into account in the context of climate diplomacy. 
3.5.3 The role of multilateral diplomacy in achieving climate action
What COP 26 needs to achieve
The COP 26 website itself designates the following four main targets 
for the conference (UN Climate Change Conference UK 2021 2021):
1. Secure global net zero by mid-twenty-first century and keep 1.5 degrees 
Celsius within reach.
2. Adapt to protect communities and natural habitats.
3. Mobilise finance.
4. Work together to deliver.
A total of 137 countries have now committed to achieving net zero 
emissions, most by 2050 at the latest (Wallach 2021). Therefore, as Rutter 
(2021) argues, the emphasis must shift from high-level targets to practical 
steps and agreements to make those targets achievable. Mobilising 
finance and working together to deliver will be key parts of this. 
What the UN can do to assist climate action
The UN has been central in mobilising countries to pay attention to 
climate change. The UNFCCC is the core framework from which many 
familiar climate-related bodies and procedures have arisen, including 
the IPCC and the COPs. Steiner (2007) claims that ‘the United Nations is 
the only forum in which an agreement aimed at reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions... can realistically be brokered among... 190 plus countries’. 
Going into the future, the UN must continue to play this brokering role, 
acting as a forum through which countries can meet to make progress 
in climate diplomacy. The UN must hold countries accountable to their 
climate targets in order to ensure not only ambition, but deliverability. 
Climate diplomacy in a post-Covid-19 world
Yixiu (2021) claims that, despite the tumultuous experiences brought about 
by the Covid-19 pandemic, there have been some positives in the year 
2020. These include: a forced re-thinking about how people relate to the 
natural world; beginning to take seriously the idea of finding nature-based 
solutions to climate change; the introduction of a net zero pledge by China; 
the concept of ‘Build Back Better’. In the post-Covid-19 world, countries 
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must acknowledge how our world is truly global, such that challenges 
faced in one country can spill over into other countries. This is the case 
for climate change, where one country’s actions can impact others, even 
those which are far away. We must show respect to other countries by not 
causing damage and work together to find solutions to global crises. 
3.6 Analysis
In order to meaningfully mitigate climate change, a rapid and universal 
response is required. This is not a crisis which can be solved by any individual 
country alone, and any country which does not act swiftly and radically 
holds back not only itself, but other countries around the world. The 
impacts of climate change will be devastating if business as usual persists. 
It is not solely the environment that will be (and in many cases, is already 
being) affected, but also human health and safety, jobs, and livelihoods. 
It is therefore in everyone’s best interests to mitigate climate change as 
rapidly and effectively as possible. However, this is easier said than done 
when facing challenges in coordinating actors across society, in sourcing 
the investment required for massive green infrastructure projects in transport 
and energy systems, and in maintaining public support through a transition 
that will be disruptive to people’s lifestyles and economic stability. Climate 
change is not a standalone issue, and any solution which is proposed to 
mitigate emissions or enable adaptation must also consider the ripple 
effects on access to energy and on the ability of people to maintain or 
gain a high quality of life – particularly regarding the impact on already 
disadvantaged socioeconomic groups. This is important for all countries to 
consider, but especially those such as Canada which have regions where 
a great many people are likely to be deeply affected by the transition. 
Despite the difficulties posed by the transition, all countries need 
to act swiftly and decisively in favour of climate action. The US 
should continue with its renewed climate ambition, pushing ahead 
with the B3W and installing the necessary incentives to transform 
the energy industry and transport sector. The UK needs to flesh out 
a roadmap to achieving its ambitious targets. Australia needs to 
catch up with other nations and make its climate targets official.
In this time of crisis, it is more important than ever for countries to come 
together to support each other through diplomacy, sharing strategies which 
have been successful and finding areas of mutual benefit to work on through 
joint schemes and initiatives. Fostering healthy competition to encourage 
innovation will also help us discover and create the technologies that will 
one day allow us to be not only a net zero world, but a net negative one. 
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Setting strong policies and incentives is an essential step for all actors who 
are in a position to do so. Markets will not respond automatically to the 
environmental crisis unless there are financial incentives and regulations to 
nudge them in the right direction. And given the vast array of responsibilities 
and issues they have to deal with on a day-to-day basis, governments 
will not prioritise targets which are set to be achieved in several decades’ 
time unless they are held to account for their steps towards them today. 
The UN, and climate accountability structures, play an important function 
in mandating governments to act now rather than postponing until 2049. 
This case study laid out the key policy approaches related to climate change 
of a variety of different countries, in addition to the diplomacy dynamics in 
this space. 
Climate change is set to impact not only the natural environment, but 
structures at every level of human society. It is therefore an issue which 
cannot be treated on its own but must be considered in the context of a just 
transition, protecting people’s livelihoods, jobs, and safety around the world. 
While most Western nations have now set climate targets such as a net 
zero by 2050 goal, Australia lags behind; meanwhile, China appears 
to have begun to increase ambition on its climate policy while leaving 
room for manoeuvre within its targets. It is important for all countries to 
come together at COP26 to lay out a clear policy agenda which is not 
only agreed upon verbally but also implemented actively and rapidly. 
There are some points of tension which are likely to remain challenging 
throughout the climate transition. These include anywhere where clashes 
in national interests occur (such as the need for some countries to import 
the majority of the natural resources for their green energy technologies), 
times when controversial issues external to climate are brought to the 
table as negotiating levers, and attempts to reach an agreement on 
how to practically source and deliver climate finance for countries which 
cannot afford to transition alone. All these issues involve countries having 
to make counterintuitive compromises, which they will be reluctant to 
do on the basis of national security and economic development. 
However, despite these difficulties, there are numerous points of 
opportunity to pursue. Few other world issues put all countries in the 
same boat quite like climate change does. Although their respective 
contributions to the problem and the level and types of impact they will 
experience vary dramatically, no country is completely shielded from the 
changing climate. This should be seen as an extraordinary opportunity 
for countries to work together to find solutions that truly benefit everyone. 
Given the fact that climate intersects with so many other issues such 
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as health, economic development and poverty, this is also a chance to 
transfer holistic, mutually beneficial systems thinking to other domains. 
Furthermore, the solutions to the climate crisis require many of the things 
which countries usually wish to foster, such as increased innovation, new jobs, 
healthy environments (leading to healthier people), and opportunities for all 
to be competitive in the global market. The US and China have the potential 
to compete in the domain of green technologies and infrastructure, and 
Africa has the potential to make an enormous contribution to the market 
for generating renewable energies – which could in turn transform the 
economies of many countries within Africa. These benefits have the potential 
to improve the economic prospects of billions of people internationally. 
Given that mitigating and adapting to climate change is a necessity for 
most countries, there is plenty of potential to find points of collaboration, 
although a dynamic of competition may suit certain policy areas given the 
pre-existing rivalry between countries. Yet ultimately, whether countries 
choose to work together or work competitively, provided that progress is 
being made, then this is good news for the world of climate and SDD. 
So long as action is fast and no one is left behind in a transition which 
is just, the exact methods of achieving the targets do not matter. 
Nonetheless, it is up to global policymaking institutions and governments 
around the world to set the right mandates and incentives to encourage 
climate action today, rather than delaying until it is too late. 
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4. Cooperation and healthy 
competition: Covid-19 diplomacy, 
sustainable development, 
and the role of China 
4.1  Global health: introduction
The world is becoming more and more interconnected due to 
globalisation. As a consequence, there is an increasing need 
for joint efforts to deal with shared global public health issues. 
The Covid-19 pandemic has accelerated this trend. 
Traditionally, global health actors are mainly restricted to the World 
Health Organization (WHO) and national health ministries (Szlezák 
et al. 2010). However, the scope of global health governance 
is developing with the scale of complexity of the global health 
environment. Civil society, NGOs, private firms, and other actors are 
joining the global health stage and shaping the formal and informal 
rules and norms over the interaction with old actors (ibid.). 
The current global health governance architecture consists of five 
types of key stakeholders: intergovernmental organisations such 
as the WHO, UN, and World Bank; states such as the G20; regional 
groupings and regional initiatives such as the African Union; 
public–private partnerships; and non-state and private actors 
such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (Youde 2017). 
Global cooperation and solidarity are vital to combat the negative 
influence of the Covid-19 pandemic. Given the scale of challenges and 
intricacy of problems in global health, broad engagement of different 
actors and stakeholders is indispensable in addressing global challenges 
(Moomaw et al. 2016). Collective action and coordination among different 
actors play a critical role in global health crises. In other words, SDD 
needs deeper participation of all relevant stakeholders. In addition, it is 
significant to promote more informal dialogues in an era of uncertainty. 
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4.2 China’s role in global health 
governance and vaccine diplomacy
With around 1.4 billion people, counting for one fifth of the world’s population, 
China has always been one of the most significant actors for global health. 
In addition, a number of international infectious disease such as SARS and 
the Asian flu were first detected or appeared in China (Afari 2020). The role of 
China in the global health system is not only significant for Chinese people, 
but also important for the global population. The engagement of China in 
global health governance is significant, although the role of the Chinese 
government remains unclear and uncertain (Gauttam, Singh and Kaur 2020).
China has been engaging in global health governance in its own way. 
Although the Chinese government reiterates that China is a strong supporter 
of multilateralism, its foreign policy and development diplomacy reflect 
a more bilateral approach than a multilateral one (Genevaz 2021). For 
example, during the regional Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014, China 
donated US$123m-worth of humanitarian aid to fight the Ebola epidemic, 
whereas it only contributed US$56,500 to the WHO for two combined years. 
It seems that China is playing health diplomacy over partner countries 
(ibid.). This has become even clearer from China’s role in global health 
governance during the Covid-19 pandemic. Health diplomacy is ‘political 
activity that meets the dual goals of improving health while maintaining 
and strengthening international relations’ (Chattu and Knight 2019: 151). 
More than 4.8 million people globally have died as a result of the Covid-19 
pandemic (Worldometer 2021). The pandemic has threatened the 
achievements of recent years in the public health sector, and the entire 
world is suffering from a series of setbacks from Covid-19 and its knock-on 
impacts. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, WHO Director-General, stated 
that vaccine inequality is the biggest obstacle to stopping this pandemic 
and recovering from Covid-19 (WHO 2021). During the first International 
Forum on Covid-19 Vaccine Cooperation, the UN Secretary-General António 
Guterres stated that a key to ending the pandemic is to get 70 per cent 
of the world population vaccinated, meaning that we need over 11 billion 
doses (UN News 2021). He underscored the necessity of a global vaccine 
plan to boost vaccine production and ensure equal distribution by using 
COVAX (Covid-19 Vaccines Global Access) as the platform, and reiterated 
that the international community, especially the G20, must coordinate 
to tackle vaccine inequality (ibid.). In a joint news release on 22 July 2021, 
UNDP, WHO, and the University of Oxford stated that Covid-19 vaccine 
inequity will have a profoundly negative effect on socioeconomic recovery 
in the global South if there is no immediate action to convert this trend, and 
this would inevitably undermine global economic recovery (WHO 2021). 
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Against this backdrop, China proposed to build the Healthy Silk Road to 
deal with the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. As a result, China has provided 
1.2 billion doses of vaccines and stock solutions to more than 100 countries 
and international organisations and has provided anti-epidemic material 
assistance to more than 150 countries and 14 international organisations 
(China News 2021). China is the country that has provided the most 
vaccines to developing countries (China International Development 
Cooperation Agency 2021). President Xi Jinping delivered a written 
speech to the Global Health Summit in May 2021, suggesting that China 
will continue to do its best to help developing countries cope with the 
pandemic. Throughout this year, China will strive to provide 2 billion 
doses of vaccine to the world and has decided to donate US$100m to 
COVAX (CGTN 2021). It seems that China intends to play a leading role 
in this global vaccine plan. There is no doubt that China is becoming an 
important force in promoting the equitable distribution of global vaccines. 
In addition, China is also working to promote its image by providing 
medical supplies and assistance to countries hit hard by coronavirus. 
The Covid-19 pandemic provides a unique opportunity for China to exercise 
and expand its leadership via health diplomacy and vaccine diplomacy, 
and it allows China to further exert its international development agenda 
on aid-receiving countries (Gauttam, Singh and Kaur 2020). In other 
words, China has integrated health diplomacy into its foreign policy as a 
way of expanding geopolitical influence. By providing international aid 
and vaccines to countries that joined the Healthy Silk Road, the bilateral 
relationship between China and aid-receiving countries is strengthened, 
and this will inevitably contribute to China’s geopolitical influence. China’s 
increasing assertiveness and participation in global health governance 
indicate its attempt to claim international leadership (Weiss 2021). 
There is no doubt that China plays an irreplaceable role in tackling 
global challenges. Its active participation in COVAX and global 
health governance is an essential element in building back better 
after the pandemic. The security, prosperity, and freedoms of each 
country are very interconnected; therefore, different countries must 
work together towards a shared agenda (White House 2021).
4.3 China’s evolving approach to SDD in the 
context of the priority of climate change
The careful mapping exercise on all the elements necessary for effective 
SDD in climate change – integrated into SDD generally – is extremely 
difficult to put into practice because of the overwhelming roles of not 
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merely nation states, but two hegemonic states (China and the US). 
It is nevertheless essential to recognise the necessity of responding 
to climate change and achieving sustainable development. 
China has preferred to start its own club rather than playing by norms set 
by the West (Allison 2017: 23). This is especially so when it comes to its SDG 
progress and diplomacy. In September 2013, President Xi announced China’s 
intention to invest US$1.4tn in building a land-based Silk Road Economic 
Belt, and a sea-based 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, connecting China 
directly with 65 countries across Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe, 
namely the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Allison 2017; Sacks 2021). The BRI 
countries account for over 40 per cent of global GDP, 40 per cent of world 
trade, and 60 per cent of world population, over 50 per cent of whom 
are living under the extreme poverty line (UNDESA 2019). However, the 
BRI has identified five priority areas for international cooperation: policy 
coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, 
and people-to-people bond (NDRC 2021). These priorities link closely to 
the 17 SDGs. In addition, the BRI is an open development proposal and 
welcomes other countries to join (UNDESA 2019). Therefore, the joint efforts 
to build and promote the BRI would also facilitate the SDGs and benefit the 
world as a whole (Gu, Corbett and Leach 2019). There are 140 countries and 
32 international organisations that have joined the BRI (Xinhua News 2021). 
The BRI illustrates that China has integrated the SDGs into China’s 
long-term international development strategies. The BRI can create 
synergy and complementarity between the international agenda 
and domestic strategies (Zhou 2020; Gu and Kitano 2018). President Xi 
Jinping made it clear in his speech in 2017 at the 19th Party Congress 
that China will actively promote international cooperation through 
the BRI to facilitate its sustainable development agenda. The speech 
indicates that the BRI is a method and promoter for the SDGs. 
More importantly, the BRI is an outstanding example to illustrate 
how development strategy can serve a role in diplomacy. Through 
the BRI, economic and social connections are increasing between 
partnership countries and China. Economic ties between low- and 
middle-income countries and China are growing (Gu and Carey 
2019). The total volume of trade in goods between China and the 
countries along the BRI routes reached US$9.2tn in 2021 and the 
cumulative direct investment in the countries along the route was 
US$136bn (Xinhua News 2021). China is the top-listed trading partner 
of most countries in East, Central, and South Asia, with enormous 
economic ties with the rest of the globe (Kastner and Pearson 2021).
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However, although the BRI involves many countries around the world, 
it strengthens the bilateral relationship between the BRI countries and 
China. The investment and resources of China are tilting towards BRI 
partnership countries. China has implemented thousands of complete sets 
of projects and material assistance projects, tens of thousands of technical 
cooperation and human resource development cooperation projects, 
and more than 400,000 personnel trainings, as well as providing medical 
materials to more than 160 countries and international organisations, 
and aid and vaccines to more than 100 countries and international 
organisations (China International Development Cooperation Agency 2021).
With the consistently changing global social and economic environment, 
China has proposed a new agenda built on the BRI but with bigger vision 
and positioning. On 10 January 2021, the official White Paper China’s 
International Development Cooperation in the New Era, issued by the 
State Council Information Office (SCIO 2021) pointed out that, regarding 
international development cooperation, China’s mission is to promote 
the building of a community with a shared future for mankind via its BRI 
platform under the framework of the UN 2030 Sustainable Development 
Agenda (Gong, Gu and Teng 2019). It further illustrates the interconnection 
between the SDGs and the BRI, as well as the combination of Chinese 
SDD with political interests in China’s international development strategy. 
In a way, the new mission shifts the China-centred development 
approach to a China-proposed sustainable development strategy, and 
it is based on the recognition of interconnection and interdependence 
of the global village and a shared future facing the global villagers. 
However, both the BRI and the new mission came under attack 
and has received growing suspicion and negative feeling among 
some nations, particularly the US. According to the report of the US 
Department of Defence, ‘China intends to use BRI to develop strong 
economic ties with other countries, shape their interests to align with 
China’s, and deter confrontation or criticism of China’s approach to or 
stance on sensitive issues’ (cited in Kastner and Pearson 2021: 19).
The BRI has been named ‘debt trap diplomacy’ by Indian geostrategist 
Brahma Chellaney in 2017 (Rana and Ji 2020). Some people  believe that 
the aim of the BRI is to spread the Chinese Model and authoritarianism 
abroad to increase China’s political engagement and global influence 
(Dezenski 2020). In addition, former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo 
stated that the BRI is full of secret deals and corruption in exchange 
for political influence (Reuters Staff 2019). Similarly, former US National 
Security Advisor John Bolton argued that ‘China uses bribes, opaque 
agreements and the strategic use of debt to hold states in Africa captive 
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to Beijing’s wishes and demands’ (cited in Landler and Wong 2018). It seems 
that impressions of the BRI have always been associated with political 
empowerment and manipulation. Nevertheless, it is hard to deny that the 
BRI partly enables the Chinese government to achieve its geostrategic 
agenda and advance foreign policy (Kastner and Pearson 2021). 
In fact, the BRI has become the focal point of geopolitical competition 
between China and the West. United States President Joe Biden’s 
administration, along with the G7, announced a new initiative called 
Build Back Better World (B3W), seen as an alternative to China’s BRI, 
collectively providing hundreds of billions of US dollars of financial 
support for infrastructure to low- and middle-income countries with 
transparency and sustainability (Holland and Faulconbridge 2021). The 
B3W connects the different parts of the world, and different G7 partners 
are responsible for different geographic orientations (White House 2021). 
Such arrangements can reduce risks on one single country and grant 
more flexibility to mobilise resources and facilitate the operation and 
implementation. B3W has a different emphasis to China’s BRI: it is a 
values-driven initiative with special focuses on climate, health and health 
security, digital technology, and gender equity and equality (ibid.). The 
B3W reflects a simple fact: the US and the West are recognising the value 
of the BRI, and therefore they have to catch up to the advantages that 
China has made in its international development strategy. It also partly 
indicates that China’s international engagement works positively in BRI 
countries, and the West would like to duplicate the Chinese model in 
terms of SDD. Clearly, there is some tension between the BRI and the B3W, 
because the latter has been explicitly announced as a ‘green alternative’ 
to the BRI (Wintour 2021). Over 60 per cent of energy funding in the BRI 
has been spent on non-renewables (Maizland 2021), although China has 
now scaled back investment in coal plants for the BRI (Brown 2021). 
4.4 Stable tension: shared crisis or shared future?
With the US-led unipolar international order fading away, the global balance 
of power has dramatically shifted and China has risen in power due to the 
following reasons (Allison 2017). Firstly, the US counted for 50 per cent of 
the global economic market after the Second World War, but it has been 
constantly declining in the global market – to 22 per cent in 1980, and 
then 16 per cent today – due to the rising power of China. Secondly, over 
this same period, China’s share of the global economy was soaring, from 
2 per cent in 1980 to 18 per cent in 2016, and it is predicted to be on its way 
to 30 per cent in 2040. China’s annual growth is 10 per cent a year, which 
is 6 per cent higher than the US economy on average. Finally, China has 
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already surpassed the US on most indicators such as steel and furniture, and 
has become the manufacturing powerhouse of the world. To put it simply, 
‘since the Great Recession, 40 per cent of all economic growth globally has 
occurred in just one country: China’ (Allison 2017: 25). The US administration 
has adopted major foreign policy on rebalancing China’s growing weight 
to counter the influence of China’s rise in the Asia-Pacific region (ibid.). 
GDP reflects national power, although GDP does not translate directly 
into a country’s economic or military power (ibid.). The concept of balance 
of power has shifted from largely military power to a combination of 
economic and military power, namely, ‘geo-economics, which is the use 
of economic instruments such as trade, investment policy, sanctions, 
cyberattacks and foreign aid to achieve geopolitical goals’ (ibid.: 68). GDPs 
of great powers play a proportional influence in shaping international 
affairs on the international stage. For China, influencing foreign policy 
through economic instruments is normal as it has the capability to do it. 
China is the largest trading partner for more than 130 countries. Its trade 
with members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
accounted for 15 per cent of ASEAN’s total trade in 2015, while the US 
accounted for only 9 per cent (ibid.) This imbalance will accelerate in 
the absence of the Trans-Pacific Partnership as China moves quickly to 
establish its own equivalent in an emerging co-prosperity area (ibid.: 70).
In 2012, Xi Jingping proposed to President Obama that the US and China 
should jointly invent a ‘new form of great power relations’, in which each 
would respect one another’s bottom lines. For Xi, this meant to respect 
each other’s de facto sphere of influence, which for China includes Taiwan 
and Tibet, as well as China’s claims in the South China Sea. Nevertheless, 
the Obama administration rejected this proposal (ibid.: 227). After Obama, 
the Trump administration did not hide its hostility towards China, and it 
even declared a ‘trade war’ with China that has lasted until today.
The cruelty of the international community does not lie in the existence 
of competition but in the fact that when hegemonic countries create 
competition rules that are beneficial to them, they become the prevailing 
standards in the world, which small countries are forced to obey (J. Wang 
2021). The liberal international order, which was built to facilitate collective 
action through conducting decision-making processes and establishing 
shared values and norms, was formed after the Second World War by a 
limited number of powerful states and decisions are up to these founding 
states (Slaughter and LaForge 2021). It is clear that China, as one of the great 
powers in the world, is not a leading or a founding member of this, nor does it 
call the shots in these relatively exclusive international institutions. Although 
China has reiterated its support of multilateralism, it has no intention of 
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accepting a set of values and rules that the West makes without any 
consultation with China (Yan 2021; Carty and Gu 2021). International orders 
involve a set of values and principles (Slaughter and LaForge 2021). However, 
values, principles, and laws can be very different from one country to another. 
China has been trying to frame and promote its notion of ideology, such 
as social security and economic development, instead of its counterpart 
democracy and freedom that is upheld by the West (Yan 2021), but its 
differences might create a barrier to exerting SDD on the international stage.
As mentioned in the last section, to cope with China’s increasing geopolitical 
influence, the US and G7 leaders launched the B3W partnership, a 
counterpart to China’s BRI, to meet the tremendous infrastructure demands 
of the global South, in June 2021 (White House 2021). The BRI and B3W 
are open to the same group of countries and partners, so it is important 
for these countries to know the nature of B3W. Is it a healthy competition 
proposal, or a side-choosing game between the US and China?
The B3W illustrates a dilemma for many countries in the global South: BRI 
and B3W, which club to join? Singapore President Li Xianlong told the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC):
… it is very difficult for countries in Asia to choose sides. For example, from 
a trade perspective, even for US’s allies such as South Korea, Japan, 
Australia, they have deeper relations with China than the US… the 
development of China is unstoppable, and it is not wise to stop it. The 
wise thing to do is to build up relationship with each other and develop 
relationship constructively by bringing China into international system. 
However, if the US response is to be prepared and feel that the growth of 
new competitors poses a threat to the US and it does everything possible 
to prevent the other party from becoming the number one as the US must 
maintain its top position, then it would be meaningless and troublesome.  
(Vaswani 2021)
Meanwhile, international cooperation will increasingly be based around 
issue-specific coalitions (Yan 2021; Gu, Li and Zhang 2021). This is because the 
US and China might sometimes belong to some of the same clubs, 
sometimes not, depending on issues. Yan describes in her article what could 
happen in the long run: 
… countries [must] decide which to join on a case-by-case basis, 
depending on which arrangement best serves their national interests… 
A club-based international system will bring complications of its own: a 
country that joins some coalitions led by Washington and others led by 
Beijing will be a less trustworthy partner for both powers… It could also 
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become common for members of the same coalition to punish one another 
for actions required by their membership in other clubs. Such conflicts 
are likely to heighten political instability and accelerate the trend toward 
deglobalisation in the decade ahead, but they are preferable to a world 
split into rigid geopolitical blocs. 
(Yan 2021: 46)
A rigid geopolitical bloc is the exact thing that the world needs least. 
Former US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, commented on the 
US–China relationship, saying that it is normal for both sides to step 
on each other’s toes as the world’s two largest economies, but it would 
endanger the entire human race if they solve problems and manage 
their relationship by confrontation and conflict all the time (Vaswani 
2021). International cooperation would not be effective if two powers 
were clashing with each other with the expectation of side-choosing 
for other states. Given the scale of global challenges and the intricacy 
of problems in the current circumstances, global cooperation and 
solidarity are vital to the achievement of agreed SDGs and agendas.
Historical experience, culture, beliefs, and myths shape a nation’s 
self-perception (Kagan 2021). Self-perception plays a role in defining the 
national interest of a state (Constantine, Shankland and Gu 2015). The 
so-called ‘century of humiliation’ (1840–1945) has had great influence 
on China as it looked inward for causes of humiliation and methods to 
prevent it from happening again. At the same time, a view of the Western 
moral value was also initiated in China, which still persists today. Not 
long after the start of the century of humiliation in 1840, China started its 
much-needed inward-looking reflection as to why it was so vulnerable 
to Western invasions. As a consequence, for China, increasing political 
and economic power is a precondition of security. America’s influence 
following the Second World War granted it the chance to intervene 
globally in terms of economics, politics, and diplomacy as well as through 
the military (Kagan 2021). It is natural that both sides have divergences. 
Former US diplomat (and Director of the Wilson Center’s Kissinger Institute 
on China and the United States) Robert Daly states that both the US and 
China have prejudice and deep suspicions towards each other, and we are 
on an inevitable path where both sides believe that all problems can be 
attributed to the other party’s intentions and improper conspiracies (Xing 
2020). In other words, both the US and China made a mistake by only seeing 
the worst part and denying the complexity of each other. It is important 
for both China and the US to reflect and reconsider their strategy towards 
each other. Misunderstandings and misperceptions lie at the heart of the 
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relationship. The complexity of China cannot be explained clearly with the 
theory of totalitarianism and either black or white, and the West has to 
continue consistent interaction and communication to know more about 
China. It is clear that the overseas activities and projects of China are 
diverse; it is unwise to label it with one purpose and intention (Renwick and 
Gu 2020). Daly (cited in Xing 2020) said that the US must accommodate 
other countries within a certain range to find a new balance and explore the 
boundary to work with China. Also, he stated that the Chinese Communist 
Party must realise that there is no difference between inside and outside 
affairs as a great power, because anything they are doing in China is part 
of its international public relations, and it is not realistic to convince others 
to play in its favour if it does not accept international rules (cited in Xing 
2020). In short, both the US and China have problems in their external 
diplomacy and strategy, and effective cooperation requires a global 
and inclusive mindset to change traditional diplomacy towards a more 
flexible approach that can respond to a rapidly changing environment. 
In fact, it is possible for China and the US to rebuild relations, and Mahbubani 
summarised four essential observations (Mahbubani 2020). First, there is 
no conflict regarding the fundamental national interests of each country. 
The fundamental national interest of both China and the US is to improve 
the wellbeing of their people. Second, both China and the US are facing 
the same challenges: climate change and a public health crisis. There is no 
doubt that we have more chances to find solutions if the two biggest powers 
of the world cooperate with each other and work in the same direction. 
Third, an ideological battle is not inevitable. As Mahbubani explained:
It is commonly believed that a key driving force in the Sino-American 
geopolitical contest is a deep and profound ideological divide. Over 40 
years ago, when China was presented with a concrete choice, it chose 
to promote China’s national interests and sacrificed the ideology of 
communism. It also stopped promoting communism globally… Instead, 
the success and competitiveness of the Chinese economy and society is 
the real challenge. To meet this challenge, American thinkers should focus 
on ensuring the success and competitiveness of the American economy 
and society. 
(Mahbubani 2020: 160–62)
China has expressed its willingness to play an active role in global 
governance and in tackling global shared challenges such as climate 
change and the Covid-19 pandemic in cooperation with other nations on 
the General Assembly 2021. Wang Yi’s comment on China–US relations 
at the annual press conference is insightful: ‘It is not surprising that China 
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and the United States have emerged in the fusion of interests. The key is 
to compete on a fair and just basis’ (W. Wang 2021). China has publicly 
made it clear that it has objectively formed a ‘competition’ for its global 
leadership position with the US, although China may not necessarily have 
this willingness subjectively, and hopes that there will be more cooperation 
elements. Wang Yi suggested that the two countries ‘should jointly explore 
the peaceful coexistence of different systems and civilizations’ (ibid.). In fact, 
at the 2018 press conference, when faced with a question from Bloomberg 
about Trump’s aggressive evaluation of China, Wang Yi has said frankly 
about the US–China relationship: ‘If there is competition between China 
and the United States, it should also be a healthy and active competition’ 
(cited in W. Wang 2021). More importantly, both China and the US should 
establish the bottom lines of each side, and respect each other’s bottom 
line, paving the way for cooperation for global challenges and a shared 
future. In the post-Covid-19 era, the best scenario would be cooperation 
based on effective competition; as Yan (2021: 46) described the US–China 
relationship: ‘even if competition carries the day, it would be best thought of 
as a race, not a boxing match: each other is doing its best to get ahead, but 
neither has any intention of destroying or permanently changing the other’. 
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5. Conclusion
The Covid-19 pandemic and climate change have demonstrated the 
interconnection of the world, as well as the interconnection of challenges 
of the world. Sustainable development diplomacy is needed now more 
than ever to prioritise development strategies of different states and work 
on common shared challenges. Sustainable development diplomacy 
can only work when different actors recognise the value of the common 
goals and are willing to make an effort to accomplish them. Global 
sustainable development diplomacy requires a stronger policy agenda and 
greater cohesion. Competing effectively without sacrificing the benefits 
of this integration and the potential to cooperate on climate, health, 
and other global issues of common concern, or escalating into all-out 
hostilities, is a complex challenge. Sustainable development diplomacy 
could be an effective solution to dismantle the built-in complexity of 
challenges facing global leaders under the current global context. 
In addition, sustainable development diplomacy needs deeper participation 
of all relevant stakeholders. It is essential to promote more informal 
dialogues in an era of uncertainty. A new diplomacy is required that 
recognises the inherent complexity of issues and the changed realities 
of sustainable development governance. Moreover, world leaders must 
realise that the interconnections of the world and of global challenges 
require effective leadership to tackle climate change and other crises. 
The US–China relationship is the defining geopolitical contest of the twenty-
first century. The US–China relationship will play a defining role in tackling 
these shared challenges. Whether or not the US and China can cooperate 
with each other is key to tackling the shared crises. Their cooperation would 
directly influence the lives of billions of people. It is normal to step on each 
other’s toes as the world’s two largest economies, but they cannot confront 
and compete at the cost of endangering the entire human race (Vaswani 
2021). With shared crises and agendas, geopolitical contests between states 
should be oriented by common goals and mutual benefits, and limited to 
healthy competition and stable tension. Sustainable development diplomacy 
and effective leadership to adopt actions immediately are prerequisite 
to building back better under the context of the Covid-19 pandemic.
Climate change is one of the main issues where symmetry can be found 
between China and the West. However, even here, for the world as a 
whole there are considerable dangers in merely trying to reduce tensions 
between the two. As shown by the mapping exercise for climate change 
(which would also be applicable for sustainable development in general 
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and for Covid-19 diplomacy) the programmes are very unlikely to succeed 
if the decisive actors are limited to nation states, given their virtually 
irresistible tendency to zero-sum rivalry, to the exclusion of third-party 
interests. That is why it should be continuously stressed that a more radical 
institutional reform must be strived for at global, national and local levels. 
Success – especially of the climate change and health aspects of SDD 
– requires an international organisation, a kind of sustainable security 
council, supported by the technical bodies of the UN, including the WHO 
and many other bodies named in the report. The new executive security 
council should include voting participation from professional bodies and 
NGOs. The actions of international bodies such as these, which are able 
to represent the interests of most nations as well as non-governmental 
actors, can ensure that the US–China rivalry does not become the 
predominant force that determines the outcome of climate change. 
The report sets out the nature of the distinction between traditional 
inter-state diplomacy and sustainable development diplomacy. It then 
sets out the institutional changes which are necessary for the achievement 
of sustainable development diplomacy. These are at three levels: above 
the inter-state level would be the apex of a UN supranational body; and 
beneath the inter-state level there would be institutionalised participation 
of both professional experts and NGOs representing international civil 
society. All three levels should have effective voting participation in a new 
sustainable development human security council. The analytical conclusion 
of the report is that without these institutional innovations, health pandemics 
and climate change – especially the latter – will remain unresolved. 
These are globally interconnected, long-term issues which cannot be 
defined as a function of defined, isolated interests of individual states. 
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